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Introduction: An encounter, not a dialogue
Slavoj Zˇizˇek has produced a plethora of books over the past 15 years (at the
rate of over one a year), many of which are all curiously alike, as he recycles
compulsively a limited number of key themes. Yet, one never feels any sense of
sterile repetition. In revisiting a topic, he often sheds new light on it, and so con-
tinues the conversation he seems to be having with himself. Zˇizˇek is not much
interested in establishing a rational, sensible dialogue with his readers. Instead,
he is a firm believer in clear-cut positions. His writing is invariably crisp,
provocative, and devoid of any coyness. One of Zˇizˇek’s favourite one-liners is
(paraphrasing Freud): ‘Why are you saying that you’re only giving a modest
opinion when what you are giving is only a modest opinion’. Zˇizˇek doesn’t ‘do’
modesty.
Zˇizˇek is also unconventional with the choice of philosophies he reads.
Although all of his work goes through Lacanian concepts, he is not simply
someone who fetishizes post-war French thought (as so many organization the-
orists do today). Instead, he uncompromisingly connects Lacanian categories to
German idealist philosophy – the latter hardly being overly popular in organi-
zation theory. But the real uniqueness in Zˇizˇek’s writing lies in the fact that he
effortlessly blends together ‘the ‘highest’ theory (Hegel, Lacan) and unrestrained
enjoyment in the ‘lowest’ popular culture’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002a: 3), whilst casually
(some would argue naively) moving from the psychoanalytic to the political and
back again. Some might say: he’s all over the place.
At first glance he seems to write for the browser: ‘They came up with the idea
to do a CD-ROM, because I write in the same manner: click here, go there, use
this fragment, that story or scene’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002b: 43). And indeed, the typical
Zˇizˇekian unit of discourse is a wittily titled (eg, ‘the non-analysable Slovene’;
‘let the emperor have his clothes’) passage of between 5 and 15 pages, contain-
ing a dazzling cataract of demonstrations and examples from popular culture,
for which a particular idea often seems a mere pretext. Wave upon wave of
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interpretation leaves the reader at somewhat of a loss as to how these brilliant
but seemingly arbitrary sequences fit together.
If anything, Zˇizˇek’s prime purpose seems to be to shake the foundations of
his readers’ commonsensical assumptions. One of his stock phrases is ‘I am
tempted to turn the standard formula around by . . .’. Joan Copjec, in a back-
cover-commentary on a recent book (Zˇizˇek, 2004), has therefore called him jus-
tifiably ‘the master of the 180 degree turn’. Zˇizˇek tries to turn the table. He calls
himself ‘ruthlessly radical’: someone who turns the taken-for-granted assump-
tions of society upside down. Today’s typical anti-terrorist rhetoric of Western
democratic leaders often emphasizes the need to defend ‘our way of life’. Zˇizˇek
is someone who aims hard at turning the ideologies of democracy and the
assumptions of the Western way of life upside down. In this sense, he is inex-
tricably involved with the ‘war on terror’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002d).
In this chapter we aim to broadly outline Zˇizˇek’s radical project and explore
possible connections to, and subversions of, lines of thought in organization
theory – an academic field which, despite the popularity of Zˇizˇek’s work in the
wider social sciences, seems to have largely ignored his writings, with a few recent
exceptions (Fleming and Spicer, 2003; forthcoming; and Jones and Spicer, 2005).
Perhaps this ignorance is not all that surprising since Zˇizˇek likes to profile
himself firmly against a background which more or less overlaps with the cur-
rently fashionable ‘critical’ agenda in organization theory:
This background is formed by the set of (often more implicit than explicit) theoreti-
cal, ideological, and ethico-political prohibitions and injunctions. For the last two
decades, multitude has been in, unity out; contingency in, necessity out; subjectiva-
tion in, subject out; multiculturalism in, the European legacy out; difference in, uni-
versality out; antinomy in, contradiction out; resistance in, revolution out; up to much
more refined injunctions concerning style. (Zˇizˇek, 2003a: 499)
Having said that – and hopefully having lured the reader into this chapter – our
encounter with Zˇizˇek is not so much a matter of carefully analysing every detail
of his philosophical project and applying it to organization theory. It is more
like the occurrence of some kind of short-circuit as a result of which ‘the reader
should not simply have learned something new: the point is, rather, to make him
or her aware of another – disturbing – side of something he or she knew all the
time’ (Zˇizˇek, 2003b: preface). Ultimately, Zˇizˇek is not really interested in ‘careful’
theoretical analyses of texts. He cares mainly about events: events that shock;
events that reveal the dirty underbelly of taken-for-granted social reality. And
this is how one should approach Zˇizˇek’s work: rather than subjecting it to careful
textual scrutiny and debate, one should see the mountain of texts he has pro-
duced over the past 15 years or so as an event. The task of this chapter is to
give the reader a glimpse of this event and begin to evaluate its significance 
for organization theory. Whilst his work clearly provides strong connections 
with important organizational themes – power, subjectivity, ideology, and the
philosophy of organization – Zˇizˇek would probably balk at being described as
an ‘organization theorist’. Indeed, a Zˇizˇekian approach to ‘doing organization
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theory’ would probably result in the destruction of the very idea of organiza-
tion theory, as the field would have to confront its own impossibility. Perhaps
we should see Zˇizˇek therefore not so much as an organizational theorist, but
rather as the objet petit a of organization theory; ‘that ‘bone in the throat’ which
gives a pathological twist to every symbolization’ (Zˇizˇek, 2003b: 67).
Lacan and Hegel: Zˇizˇek’s theoretical matrix
Zˇizˇek’s work is characterized by a unique blending of Lacanian psychoanalysis,
Hegelian dialectics and the philosophies of a range of mainly German thinkers
(particularly Marx, Kant, and Schelling). Due to space restrictions we will con-
centrate our discussion on Zˇizˇek’s interpretation of Lacan and Hegel, as they
provide the backbone for his theoretical project. Much of Zˇizˇek’s writing turns
around the Lacanian RSI triad, tracing the relationship between the Real, the
Symbolic, and the Imaginary (see eg, Lacan, 1977, 1998). Zˇizˇek’s Lacan is very
much the Lacan who, at the end of the 1950s, began to move away from the
relation between the Symbolic and the Imaginary in favour of a sustained inter-
rogation of the interplay between the Symbolic and the Real (Nicol, 2001). Zˇizˇek
understands the Symbolic as the arbitrary system of meanings into which we
divide our world, an entity which pre-exists us, and into which we are born,
learning and abiding by its rules. Its anonymity and vaguely sinister air is con-
veyed by its alternative name, ‘the big Other’. One of the most fundamental
insights Zˇizˇek borrows from Lacan is the idea that the Symbolic or the ‘big
Other’ is always incomplete and both constituted and subverted by the Real.
One could also say that the Real is the lack of the ‘big Other’; it is the surplus
of reality that cannot be symbolized. For Zˇizˇek, reality is not just ‘out there’,
fully constituted and given, unconcerned by our painful progress. Our stumbling
search for knowledge, our confusions and failures; precisely that which seems
to separate us from the way reality ‘really’ is ‘out there’, is the innermost con-
stituent of reality itself.
You symbolize nature, but in order to symbolize nature, in this very symbolization,
you produce an excess or a lack symmetrically and that’s the Real . . . the very gesture
of symbolization introduces a gap in reality. It is this gap which is the Real and every
positive form of this gap is constituted through fantasy. (Zˇizˇek and Daly, 2004: 78)
The other main theoretical source Zˇizˇek draws upon is Hegel and his philoso-
phy of dialectical negativity. Now, it is probably an understatement to say that
dialectics has not been particularly popular within the realms of organization
theory in recent years (for a discussion, see, for example, Carr, 2000; Hancock
and Tyler, 2001; Reed, 1996; and Willmott, 1990). A typical interpretation of
the dialectical process is delivered by Burrell and Morgan when they state that
‘the dialectic stresses that there is a basic antagonism and conflict within both
the natural and the social world which, when resolved, leads to a higher stage
of development. This dialectical process is seen as a universal principle, which
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generates progress towards the state of “absolute knowledge” ‘(1979: 280–281).
Within such a view, the dialectical process is seen as the bringing together of
antagonistic categories – thesis and antithesis – in order to produce a new, pro-
gressive synthesis. Zˇizˇek, however, reads Hegel very differently. In his view, the
synthesis does not heal any wound cut open by an antithesis; it is not necessar-
ily progressive and it does not return to a positive identity (1989: 176). Instead,
the synthesis is characterized by antagonisms as much as the ‘original’ thesis is.
This brings us back to the Lacanian Real. If reality can be seen as a kind of
social synthesis, Zˇizˇek maintains that this synthesis can never be a finality or
totality. Instead, social reality – the synthesis – is always subverted by the Real:
a plethora of antitheses that constitute the failure of the closure of society or
any form of organization.
Zˇizˇek’s popularity partly hinges on the fact that he does not simply repro-
duce ‘dry’ theoretical constructs, but constantly seeks to illustrate them by
making reference to popular culture and other examples. Lévi-Strauss’ famous
anthropological study of the spatial disposition of buildings of the Winnebago
is one such example Zˇizˇek uses to illustrate his theoretical position. The tribe
Lévi-Strauss studied is divided into two subgroups. When an individual from
each subgroup is asked to draw on sand the ground-plan of his or her village
we obtain two quite different answers depending on his or her belonging to one
subgroup or the other. Both perceive the village as a circle; but for one subgroup
there is another circle of central houses within this circle, so that we have two
concentric circles; while for the other subgroup the circle is split in two by a clear
dividing line. The two drawings of the ground-plan are two mutually exclu-
sive endeavours with the function of inventing imaginary representations of
social contradictions. The Real here is not the actual spatial arrangement of
houses, but the traumatic core of the social antagonism that distorts the tribe
members’ view:
The site of truth is not the way “things really are in themselves”, beyond their per-
spectival distortions, but the very gap, passage, that separates one perspective from
another, the gap (in this case social antagonism) that makes the two perspectives 
radically incommensurable. The ‘Real as impossible’ is the cause of the impossibility
of ever attaining the ‘neutral’ nonperspectival view of the object. There is a truth;
everything is not relative – but this truth is the truth of the perspectival distortion as
such, not the truth distorted by the partial view from a one-sided perspective. (Zˇizˇek,
2003b: 79)
Such a conceptualization provides a formidable challenge to so-called ‘Critical
Realist’ voices within organization theory (eg. Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000;
Mingers, 1995; Morgan and Sturdy, 2000; and Reed, 1997 – for a short overview
of ‘critical realist’ writings within organization theory see Burrell, 2003). Con-
trary to Zˇizˇek’s understanding of the ‘Real as impossible’, Critical Realists –
whose work is influenced by writers such as Bhaskar (1989) and Archer (1995)
– maintain that the Real has an inner constitution and is made up of essences
which are not amenable to human observation. Yet, the position that the truth
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of social reality lies exactly in its impossibility clearly resonates well with the 
theoretical project of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), which conceptualizes social
organization as a ‘structural undecidability’, as Laclau (1996) calls it (Laclau
being an important ‘father figure’ who introduced Zˇizˇek to the Anglo-Saxon
publishing world).
Zˇizˇek’s theoretical matrix has a range of implications that should be of inter-
est to organization theorists. In what follows we concentrate our discussion on
his conceptualization of self and society, his understanding of the workings of
ideology, and his critique of capitalism.
Subjectivity, ideology, capitalism
For Zˇizˇek, the Real penetrates both society and the individual, which means that
both are always thrown out of kilter. Thus, what we take for substantive enti-
ties (eg, self and society), are actually hollow. The only substance is the Real of
jouissance, which is excluded from both, but which subtends the sense of every-
day ‘reality’.1 The core of subjectivity is a void filled in by fantasy, and the fact
that we can only ever plug our lack with fantasy after fantasy is what keeps us
up and running (Eagleton, 2003). Zˇizˇek’s (1997) point is that this fantasy is also
characteristic of what we call ‘society’ or ‘organization’. That is, the social – the
political and economic relations that make up society or organization – are fan-
tastic in the sense of being both illusionary and real fillings of the fundamen-
tal gap that describes them.
Precisely because jouissance restlessly invests across the boundaries of self
and society, the libidinal cannot be confined to subjectivity or psychology. It
provides the tissue of fantasies that make up the social/organizational whilst the
narrowly libidinal itself is a web of social and political representations. In this
breaking down of the barriers between concepts of desire and libido (the ‘sub-
jective’) and the social, political and economic (the ‘objective’), Zˇizˇek’s project
has clear resonances with that of Deleuze (see Zˇizˇek, 2004, see also Sørensen,
in this volume), although they seek to achieve their ends by different means and
in different forms.
Zˇizˇek is probably best known for his interventions in the theory of ideol-
ogy, as it was the core topic of his breakthrough work, The Sublime Object of
Ideology (1989). For Zˇizˇek, the important hold ideology has over us lays in its
capacity to yield jouissance; ideological power finally rests on the libidinal rather
than the conceptual, ‘on the way we hug our chains rather than the way we
entertain beliefs’ (Eagleton, 2003: 198). Because ideology is an illusion which
structures our social practices, for Zˇizˇek the ‘falsity’ lies on the side of what we
do, not necessarily of what we say or know. His standard line of argument goes
something like this: ‘we’ (eg, the ‘ethical’ consumer, the ‘left-leaning’ Western
academic, or the ‘democratic’ politician) know exactly how things are – that ‘the
West’ exploits ‘the South’ and that the Western way of life is utterly unsustain-
able. However, although we might know all sorts of things about how capitalist
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society works – and although we might create a certain cynical distance to these
things – Zˇizˇek argues that we are still doing them; we are still engaging in the
reproduction of capitalist relations precisely because these relations are objec-
tively ‘false’ and act as systematic fantasy (1989: 32).
Zˇizˇek thus performs his trademark ‘180-degree turn’ on traditional forms of
ideology critique, which assume that social practices are real but that the beliefs
used to justify them are false or illusory. Such arguments are practised, for
example, by some labour process theorists within the realms of organization
theory (eg, Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Rowlinson and Hassard, 2001;
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995; and Thompson and Smith, 2001). Zˇizˇek’s key
point is that the central ideological ingredient is to be located in the mode of
enjoyment it makes possible, which is indifferent to so-called ‘social realities’.
The aim of Zˇizˇek’s version of ideology critique is to create the conditions in
which we can experience that there is nothing behind ideology. We can resist ide-
ological power most effectively not by repudiating it but by fully accepting its
dictates, and doing so in an overly literal way that brings them to the point of
their inherent contradiction. Keeping a ‘critical distance’ points to ideological
delusion at its worst: precisely by not identifying with the web of power one is
truly caught in it.
Arguably, such conceptualizations of subjectivity and ideology pose a 
formidable challenge to some corners of organization theory. For example,
Foucauldian labour process theory (eg, Knights and Willmott, 1989; Knights,
1997, 2001; and Willmott, 1990, 1997, see O’Doherty, in this volume), which has
been one of the most popular and influential theoretical developments over the
past two decades, conceives the subject as the effect of discourses that are 
produced by ‘micro-political’ relations of power and knowledge. Knights and
Willmott’s concern – and that of other Foucauldians in organization theory –
is to show that social reality is the constitutive product of a plurality of disci-
plinary techniques of power and knowledge (1989: 549). They argue that ‘forms
of power are exercised through subjecting individuals to their own identity or
subjectivity, and are not therefore mechanisms directly derived from the forces
of production, class struggle or ideological structures’ (1989: 553). What is thus
important for Knights and Willmott is the emphasis of individual subjectivities
and the way people become tied to themselves by self-discipline and self-
knowledge (1989: 550). Such readings of Foucault’s work maintain that 
subjectivity is a ‘performative’ process of continually reshaping and choosing
alternative ‘subject positions’.
For Zˇizˇek, Foucauldian ‘micro-political’ subject positions designate a form
of subjectivity that corresponds to ‘late capitalism’, which brings us back to his
conception of the workings of capitalist ideology. His line of argument is that
today we are ‘allowed’, for example, to be gay, radical feminist and even cynical
critics of capitalism. All these different subject positions and identities are pos-
sible within contemporary capitalist relations – as long as we still engage in the
labour process and capitalist forms of accumulation and reproduction. ‘Late
capitalism’ enables a whole host of differences without necessarily challenging
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the fundamental logic of capitalist relations – this argument can also be con-
nected to Hardt and Negri’s (2000) conceptions of ‘Empire’ as a fundamentally
open regime that enables a multitude of differences to exist (see also Mandarini,
in this volume). Zˇizˇek’s point is that rather than forming all sorts of different
subject positions that aim to escape the core of capitalist fantasy, one should
engage the fundamental fantasy of capitalist relations in a direct, uncompro-
mising fashion. The way forward is therefore to ‘traverse the fantasy’ – a phrase
which he borrows from the outcome of Lacanian therapy (Kay, 2003).
Zˇizˇek’s radical politics
Zˇizˇek has been politically active in his home country Slovenia. He finished fifth
in the 1990 elections – narrowly missing becoming one of the four-person rotat-
ing presidential team – and fully supported the liberal-democratic party. Whilst
such a move fitted in with his early writings against totalitarianism from a posi-
tion that was, at least in outline, liberal; in his most recent writings he has
become an increasingly virulent critic of liberal democracy which he sees as
utterly intertwined with capitalism: ‘It is only in this way, by problematizing
democracy – by making it clear that liberal democracy a priori, in its very notion
(as Hegel would have put it), cannot survive without capitalist private property
– that we can become truly anti-capitalist’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002c: 273). Whilst Zˇizˇek
refuses to look to communism as a solution to capitalism – ‘I don’t have any
fundamental hopes in a socialist revolution or whatever’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002b: 40) –
and even describes communism as ‘a fantasy inherent to capitalism itself ’ (2000a
18), he nevertheless likes to portray himself as ‘an old-fashioned left winger’
(2002b: 39).
Zˇizˇek’s radical politics is founded, not in the notion of a difference that must
be contained or embraced, but in the notion of the universal. He sees the politi-
cal problem as one of struggle against the current of dominant, differentiating,
particularist interests. He particularly takes issue with the ontologization of
‘Democracy’ into a depoliticized universal frame which cannot be (re)negotiated.
The radicalization of politics into open warfare of us-against-them discernible in dif-
ferent fundamentalisms is the form in which the foreclosed political returns in the post-
political universe of pluralist negotiation and consensual regulation. For that reason, the
way to counteract this reemerging ultrapolitics is not more tolerance, more com-
passion and multicultural understanding, but the return of the political proper . . .
True universalists are not those who preach global tolerance of differences and all-
encompassing unity but those who engage in a passionate fight for the assertion of
the truth that engages them. (Zˇizˇek, 1998: 1002)
Zˇizˇek thus does not feel that society would be improved by a greater commit-
ment to order and democratic institutions or a more urgent call to civic duty –
a position which stands in clear contrast to some liberalist voices expressed
within the realms of organization theory (eg, Armbrüster and Gebert, 2002; du
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Gay, 2000). Furthermore, he is also pessimistic about the possibility of a gradual
production of alternative organizational regimes and sees a kind of conversion
between the dynamic of capitalist power and the dynamic of resistance (Zˇizˇek,
2004). It is not that Zˇizˇek is against political activity (his own concrete political
actions prove otherwise, and indeed demonstrate the necessity of such actions),
but he believes that traditional political activity simply does not have the capac-
ity for radical change: ‘alternative social formations . . . are, in their innermost
core, mediated by Capital as their concrete universality, as the particular for-
mation that colours the entire scope of alternatives’ (ibid: 186). His point is that
alternative approaches typically intervene at a superficial, symptomal level. They
amount to ‘doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent some-
thing from really happening, really changing’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002c: 225).
But does Zˇizˇek thereby condone a pessimist vision of social life caught in a
repetitious deadlock, without any prospect for resolution, and thus opening the
way to the ‘celebration of failure’, or even ‘utter passivity’ as critics (eg, Kay,
2003; Robinson and Tormey, 2004) have suggested? His answer is a dismissive
‘No!’, as he grasps back to a ‘proper’ universalism in his most recent works (eg,
2000a, 2002c). For Zˇizˇek, politics proper always involves a kind of short circuit
between the universal and the particular; it involves the paradox of a singular
that appears as a stand-in for the universal, destabilizing the ‘natural’ functional
order of relations in the social body. Thus, we should not see the universal (eg,
‘the non-exploitative’, ‘the egalitarian’) in terms of an acontextual absolute, but
rather as a culturally specific absolute (manifested as exception, the bone-in-the-
throat, to the dominant form of the day). One way to effect change therefore is
to seize on this exception, or on the random, contingent factor in the current
scheme of things, and force its universal implications so as to produce a new
order (Zˇizˇek, 2001a). Here his point of reference is what Badiou (2002) desig-
nates as Event: the art of seizing the right moment, of aggravating a conflict
before the System can accommodate itself to the demand.
The undecidability of the Event thus means that an Event does not possess any onto-
logical guarantee: it cannot be reduced to (or deduced, generated from) a (previous)
Situation: it emerges ‘out of nothing’. (Zˇizˇek, 1999: 136)
The cause immediately triggering it ‘is, by definition, trifling, a pseudo cause sig-
nalling that what is at stake is the relationship to the Other’ (Zˇizˇek, 2004: 205).
For Zˇizˇek, all social and organizational attempts which try to establish a plural,
egalitarian and ‘just’ order through a regime of social dialogue and bureaucratic
rules, only hide the taken-for-granted (and misconceived) universalism of
Western ‘Democracy’.
Zˇizˇek’s critics and his ‘style’
Many of the features of Zˇizˇek’s thought that I tried to identify – rapidity, passion,
high philosophical and political seriousness, a certain will to excess, and pure intel-
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lectual power – are in evidence here [in Zˇizˇek’s reply], and the stakes of his work are
spelled out with admirable precision. On a personal level, too, I am grateful to Zˇizˇek
for providing the bracing, once-in-a-lifetime experience of having a man I had just
praised as the most formidable philosophical mind of his generation immediately
denounce me as a lunatic (Harpham, 2003: 504).
Zˇizˇek usually does not respond well to criticism. In his replies he tends to be
disdainful of his critics (viz. Zˇizˇek, 2000b, 2003a), spending a handful of sen-
tences composing a response to their critique and then proceeding to write about
something entirely else that pre-occupies him. This can be seen as somewhat
symptomatic for his general writing ‘style’, which often relies on engagements
with other authors’ work that are far from ‘careful’. His writing often utilizes
‘isms’, particularly ‘postmodernism’ and ‘deconstructionism’, without engaging
with the work of individual authors in great detail. For example, he has been
accused of making outlandish claims about Derrida’s work and ‘deconstruc-
tionism’ without citing a single source of Derrida’s or other deconstructionist
writings (Gilbert, 2001).2 Zˇizˇek’s project can be further qualified by an extreme
reliance on the philosophies of Lacan and Hegel, which he utilizes to explain
almost everything. Critics, such as Laclau and Butler (Butler et al., 2000, see
also Borgerson, in this volume), maintain that his psychoanalytic insights are
not historicized enough and therefore act as almost essentialist concepts that
stand in for a rigorous historical analysis of the social contingencies of capital-
ism and left politics. A related, and milder criticism concerns the fact that at
certain stages in his books Zˇizˇek feels the need to rev up the metaphysical engine
to such an extent (for example, in his explorations of Hegel and Schelling) that
even eminent critics admit they cannot always follow his line of thought (eg,
Eagleton, 2001; Harpham, 2003a; Kay, 2003). Zˇizˇek’s writings also have been
criticized for overly relying on a multiplicity of analogies from popular culture
(such as cinema references or popular jokes) which do not always make sense;
indeed these can be seen as almost arbitrary. In an all-too-scarce instance of
self-criticism, Zˇizˇek himself expresses some reservations about the ‘succession
of anecdotes and cinema references in the Sublime Object’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002a: xi).
Furthermore, Kay (2003) points out that the interpretive zeal with which Zˇizˇek
tackles his examples is very much at odds with Lacan’s wariness of interpretation
and precipitate understanding. Finally, it is not all that clear from Zˇizˇek’s 
writings what it is we can legitimately engage with. His uncompromising 
language often seems to preclude productive engagement in empirical and 
normative debates and offers only a stark ‘all or nothing’ choice (Robinson 
and Tormey, 2004).
However (and it is a very big ‘however’), one has to tread carefully when cri-
tiquing Zˇizˇek’s work: it is precisely because he is a man who doesn’t watch his
back that it is extremely easy to find fault with the details of his work. Zˇizˇek’s
way of proceeding, in terms of style and content, poses a fundamental challenge
to conventional academic methods and practices. When Fleming (2004: 41), in
his review of the four-volume Critical Perspectives on Business and Management
behemoth, points out that ‘It is in the ominous spirit of an anti-modernist,
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anti-enlightenment, anti-progress and anti-emancipatory stance that the editors
proceed to define what they mean by ‘critical’,’ this only serves as a reminder of
how awkwardly Zˇizˇek’s project sits within a ‘critical’ organization studies.3 Very
often the target of his vitriolic critique of ‘postmodernists’ and ‘deconstruc-
tionists’ are precisely these scholars who cherry pick concepts and frameworks
for intellectual comfort, so that they can ‘relieve us of the duty to think, or even
actively prevent us from thinking’ (Zˇizˇek, 2001b: 3). For Zˇizˇek, the hope of
finding theoretical foundations that can unambiguously shore up an academic
field is necessarily illusory. His own thought relies on perpetual movement,
fuelled by the constant switches of perspective on his eclectic assembly of mate-
rials. He, in effect, follows Lacan in proceeding in a ‘mildly maniacal manner’
(Eagleton, 2001: 50), placing a continuous positive valuation upon ambiguity
and bringing theory to the brink of its own impossibility. For Zˇizˇek, theoretical
concepts are both necessary and impossible.
What sets in motion the dialectical progress in Hegel’s Logic is the inherent tension
in the status of every determinate/limited category: each concept is simultaneously
necessary (ie, indispensable if we are to conceive reality, its underlying ontological
structure) and impossible (ie, self-refuting, inconsistent: the moment we fully and con-
sequently ‘apply’ it to reality, it disintegrates and/or turns into its opposite). (Zˇizˇek,
1999: 99)
Zˇizˇek uses examples from popular culture not in order to ‘apply’ his theory – as
if there could exist a ready-made conceptual apparatus. On the contrary, his
theory is developed precisely through, or in-between, these examples. The point
is not to neatly place them within a theoretical framework but to see them as a
gesture of the jouissance of the Real. The dissatisfying obliqueness of Zˇizˇek’s
approach is precisely meant to enable the reader to see that the Real cannot be
signified directly, but is always stumbled upon in a way that is at once contin-
gent and unavoidable. He strives, perhaps impossibly, ‘to include within thought
that which is heterogeneous to it’ (Eagleton, 1991: 126). Thought is always hol-
lowed out by the inassimilable Real.
The apparent misfit between the theoretical context and the illustrative instance 
provokes Zˇizˇek’s readers to work out the reason for it . . . this working out leads us
to the problematic at the core of his writing: that of our relation to the real. By the
same token, for the reader, a relation to the real, both as something lost to conscious
thought and as a fearsome threat, is conjured in the very effort of trying to under-
stand his text. (Kay, 2003: 11)
There is a fundamental problem in the fact that Zˇizˇek tries to conceptualize
something which cannot really be conceptualized. Since what is awry is the
whole cast and frame of our consciousness, conditioned as it is by material con-
straints, no amount of intelligence or ingenuity will serve to get us further
forward. Yet, the premise is a simple one, and in following it he is utterly logical
in his radical politics: if a transformation would be intelligible, if we can talk
about it, it could not possibly be radical enough; if it is full-blooded enough, it
threatens to fall outside our comprehension. We simply ‘cannot get rid of our
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subjection through a merely intellectual reflection’ (Zˇizˇek, 2002c: 253). Thus
Zˇizˇek’s ‘style’ should not merely be critiqued, but seen as part of the aporia of
radical political writing as such.
Notes
1 Jouissance, or enjoyment, is not simply pleasure. For Lacan, pleasure is produced by the symbolic
order, the Other. Jouissance, in contrast, is beyond socially sanctioned pleasure (1998: 184); it is
located in the Real, that which is not symbolizable. Jouissance is therefore never fully attainable;
it can never be subsumed or incorporated into the Other.
2 In defence of Zˇizˇek, it has to be said that in some places in his work he provides very thought-
ful readings of Derrida (eg Zˇizˇek, 2002a: 31–38).
3 Perhaps, one of the only recent examples in organizational writing that remains true to both
Zˇizˇek’s style and his exhortation to ‘fully identify with the symptom’ (without referring to him at
all) is O’Doherty’s (2004) excessively literal (and hence deeply subversive) reading of the Finan-
cial Times Handbook of Management.
References
Ackroyd, S. and S. Fleetwood (2000) Realist Perspectives on Management and Organization. London:
Routledge.
Ackroyd, S. and P. Thompson (1999) Organizational Misbehaviour. London: Sage.
Archer, M. S. (1995) Realist Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armbrüster, T. and D. Gebert (2002) ‘Uncharted territories of organizational research: The case of
Karl Popper’s Open Society and Its Enemies’ Organization Studies, 23(2): 169–188.
Badiou, A. (2002) Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. P. Hallward. London: Verso.
Bhaskar, R. (1989) Reclaiming Reality. London: Verso.
Burrell, G. (2003) ‘The future of organization theory: Prospects and limitations’ in H. Tsoukas 
and C. Knudsen (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Burrell, G. and G. Morgan (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. London:
Heinemann.
Butler, J., E. Laclau and S. Zˇizˇek (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Carr, A. (2000) ‘Critical theory and the management of change in organizations’ Journal of
Organizational Change Management, 13(3): 208–220.
du Gay, P. (2000) In Praise of Bureaucracy: Weber, Organization, Ethics. London: Sage.
Eagleton, T. (1991) Ideology: An Introduction. London: Verso.
Eagleton, T. (2001) ‘Enjoy’ Paragraph, 24(2): 40–51.
Eagleton, T. (2003) Figures of Dissent. London: Verso.
Fleming, P. (2004) ‘Progress, pessimism, critique’ ephemera: theory and politics in organization, 4(1):
40–49.
Fleming, P. and A. Spicer (2003) ‘Working at a cynical distance: Implications for power, subjectiv-
ity and resistance’ Organization, 10(1): 157–179.
Fleming, P. and A. Spicer (2005) ‘How objects believe for us: Applications in organizational analy-
sis’, Culture and Organization, 11(3): 181–193.
Gilbert, J. (2001) ‘Contingency, hegemony, universality’ (book review) New Formations, 48.
Hancock, P. and M. Tyler (2001) ‘Managing subjectivity and the dialectic of self-consciousness:
Hegel and organization theory’ Organization, 8(4): 565–585.
Everything you wanted to know about Organization Theory . . . but were afraid to ask Slavoj Zˇizˇek
© The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review 2005
O
sore_555.qxd  9/30/2005  7:51 PM  Page 289
290
Hardt, M. and A. Negri (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Harpham, G. H. (2003a) ‘Doing the impossible: Slavoj Zˇizˇek and the end of knowledge’ Critical
Inquiry, 29(3): 453–485.
Harpham, G. G. (2003b) ‘Response to Slavoj Zˇizˇek’ Critical Inquiry, 29(3): 504–507.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1977) The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Jones, C. and A. Spicer (2005) ‘The sublime object of entrepreneurship’ Organization, 12(2):
223–246.
Kay, S. (2003) Zˇizˇek: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity.
Knights, D. (1997) ‘Organization theory in the age of deconstruction: Dualism, gender and 
postmodernism revisited’ Organization Studies, 18(1): 1–19.
Knights, D. (2001) ‘Hanging out the dirty washing: Labour process theory and its dualistic 
legacies’ International Studies of Management and Organization, 30(4): 68–84.
Knights, D. and H. Willmott (1989) ‘Power and subjectivity at work: From degradation to 
subjugation in social relations’ Sociology, 23(4): 535–558.
Knights, D. and H. Willmott (eds.) (1990) Labor Process Theory. London: Macmillan.
Lacan, J. (1977) Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1998) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan. London:
Vintage.
Laclau, E. (1996) ‘Deconstruction, pragmatism, hegemony’ in Chantal Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction
and Pragmatism. London: Routledge.
Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso.
Mingers, J. C. (1995) ‘Information and meaning: Foundations for an intersubjective account’
Information Systems Journal, 5: 285–306.
Morgan, G. and A. Sturdy (2000) Beyond Organizational Change. London: Macmillan.
Nicol, B. (2001) ‘As if: Traversing the fantasy in Zˇizˇek’ Paragraph, 24(2): 140–155.
O’Doherty, D. (2004) ‘Management? . . . whatever’ ephemera: theory and politics in organization,
4(1): 76–93.
Reed, M. (1996) ‘Rediscovering Hegel: The “new historicism” in organization and management
studies’ Journal of Management Studies, 33(2): 139–158.
Reed, M. (1997) ‘In praise of duality and dualism: Rethinking agency and structure in organiza-
tional analysis’ Organization Studies, 18(1): 21–42.
Robinson, A and S. Tormey (2004) ‘Zˇizˇek is not a radical’ Thesis Eleven, 78.
Thompson, P. and C. Smith (2001) ‘Follow the redbrick road: Reflections on pathways in and out
of the labor process debate’ International Studies on Management and Organization, 30(4): 40–
67.
Thompson, P. and S. Ackroyd (1995) ‘All quiet on the workplace front? A critique of recent trends
in British Industrial Sociology’ Sociology, 29(4): 615–633.
Willmott, H. (1990) ‘Subjectivity and the dialectics of praxis: Opening up the core of labour process
analysis’ in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.) Labour Process Theory. London: Macmillan.
Willmott, H. (1997) ‘Rethinking management and managerial work: Capitalism, control, and 
subjectivity’ Human Relations, 50(11): 1329–1358.
Zˇizˇek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso:.
Zˇizˇek, S. (1997) The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso.
Zˇizˇek, S. (1998) ‘A leftist plea for Eurocentrism’ Critical Inquiry, 24(4).
Zˇizˇek, S. (1999) The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2000a) The Fragile Absolute or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? London:
Verso.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2000b) ‘From proto-reality to the act: A reply to Peter Dews’ Angelaki, 5(3): 141–148.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2001a) On Belief. London: Routledge.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2001b) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion.
London: Verso.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2002a) For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (second edn.).
London: Verso.
Steffen Böhm and Christian De Cock
© The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review 2005
O
sore_555.qxd  9/30/2005  7:51 PM  Page 290
291
Zˇizˇek, S. (2002b) ‘Civil society, fanaticism, and digital reality’ in G. Lovink (ed.) Uncanny Networks:
Dialogues with the Virtual Intelligentsia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2002c) Revolution at the Gates: Selected Writings of Lenin from 1917. London: Verso:.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2002d) ‘Are we in a war? Do we have an enemy?’ London Review of Books, 24(10).
Zˇizˇek, S. (2003a) ‘Critical response: I a symptom – of what?’ Critical Inquiry, 29(3): 486–503.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2003b) The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Zˇizˇek, S. (2004) Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences. London: Routledge.
Zˇizˇek, S. and G. Daly (2004) Conversations with Zˇizˇek. Cambridge: Polity.
Everything you wanted to know about Organization Theory . . . but were afraid to ask Slavoj Zˇizˇek
© The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review 2005
O
sore_555.qxd  9/30/2005  7:51 PM  Page 291
